

Office of Safeguards & Security Assessments Update

EFCOG SSWG

April 2021

Topics

- The Last Year
 - Report Structure
 - Assessments
 - Observations
 - Changes to the Office of Safeguards and Security Assessments (EA-20) large scale performance assessment methods
 - Upcoming schedule

Report Topics

- Five Topic Areas
 - Protection Program Management (PPM)
 - Physical Protection Systems (PPS)
 - Protective Force
 - Material Control and Accountability (MC&A)
 - Information Security (IS)
 - Technical surveillance countermeasures, TEMPEST,
Protected Distribution Systems
- 3000 Requirements
- 70 Sub-Topics

Report Structure

- Synopsis
 - An unclassified summary of the appraisal results, primarily to support coordination with S-1 and S-2
- Executive Summary
 - One-to-two-page summary of the appraisal results, primarily for senior Federal and contractor management
- Introduction
 - Five to ten pages, primarily for line management and staff
 - Introduction
 - Scope Methodology
 - General results grouped by organizations and topic

Report Structure

- Results Sections
 - Technical analyses for line management and practitioners
 - Sectioned by Topical Area
 - Subtopic Area
 - Part 1: Introduction paragraph outlining the requirement and specific subtopic assessment scope
 - Part 2: Results includes an assessment of previous findings and the detailed analyses derived from the lines of inquiries
 - Part 3: Conclusion statement addressing if the assessed entity is or is not meeting the requirements outlined in Part 1
 - Topical Area Conclusion
 - Statements of compliance and performance for each subtopic
 - Opportunities for Improvement



EA-20 Report Structure

- **X.X.1 Posting Notices**
- Department of Energy (DOE) requires sites to have a posting notice published in the Federal Register (FR), and security areas must have appropriate signage. The scope of this assessment included **[site-specific facilities and real property]**.
- The **[insert site/facility name]** posting notice in the FR reflects the site property subject to the jurisdiction, administration, or custody of DOE and describes the area covered, including the name and location of the area. In addition, the governing program office provides the property information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation office exercising investigative responsibility.
- The **[insert site/facility name]** posting notice describes the property boundaries subject to DOE's jurisdiction, and the site posts the required signage for each security area. These ensure that the public and employees are aware of the security boundaries and associated regulations, security requirements, and potential consequences of crossing those boundaries.

Assessment Activities

- Two Special Access Program Assessments, October 2020
- Multi-Topic Assessment at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory – mostly remote
- Multi-Topic Assessment at the Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory – 100% remote
- Review of the Department’s Insider Threat Program
- Multi-Topic Assessment at the Idaho National Laboratory – 100% remote

What We Have Learned

- Larger Data Call – if you can believe it could get larger!
- Can make compliance and performance statements based on documentation
- Some topics have data to prove implementation
- It takes more time then 3 weeks on the ground
- Use of Classified Video Teleconferencing (CVTC)
- Use of WebEx

Positive Observations

- Sites have generally implemented effective access authorization programs.
- Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC new radio system is a digital information system.
- University of Tennessee-Battelle, LLC has implemented a largely automated, Protective Force fit-for-duty dashboard.
- Site tamper-indicating device (TID) programs are generally well administered. TIDs are secured in approved containers, accounted for, and correspond to nuclear material accounting records.
- Generally, sites implement effective operations security programs to protect critical information, enhance mission effectiveness, and protect operations and related activities.

Adverse Observations

- Security plan documents do not always contain the required Federal Site Office responsibilities and activities.
- System effectiveness analyses do not always reflect the current posture.
- FR notices are not always amended to reflect changes in the property subject to the jurisdiction of DOE.
- Contractor Protective Force training programs are not accredited by the Training Approval Program managed by the DOE National Training Center.
- MC&A Plans are not always approved and do not always accurately describe site operations.
- An analysis is not always conducted to demonstrate equivalent protection levels for non-conforming storage.

Force-on-Force Summary of Changes

- Coordination
 - Pre-visit conference call to discuss process and expectations
 - Utilize and evaluate site's trusted agent process
 - One planning visit to site (3 days)
 - One planning completed remotely via CVTC (3 days)
- Scenario
 - Site selected/developed comprehensive Vulnerability assessment scenario(s) that are approved by the Officially Designated Federal Security Authority
 - Site will provide justification on scenario selection to EA-20



Force-on-Force Summary of Changes

- Results/Reporting
 - No Force-on-Force specific section in the EA-20 Report
 - Performance test results incorporated into overall analysis supporting Protective Force and other sub-topics
 - Large scale performance testing process and results will inform PPM, PPS, IS, and MC&A

Upcoming Assessments

- The Pantex Plant
- The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
- The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
- The Hanford Site

