

Systemic Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) Used for Cyber Security

EFCOG

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**To Answer
These:**

Can STPA be used to identify Cyber Security Requirements?

Can Secure Software Be Developed with Agile?

Explicit versus Implicit Software Requirements

Explicit Requirements

1. User adds records
2. User deletes records
3. User modifies records
4. User merges multiple records
5. Bla, bla, bla

Implicit Requirements

- Make it easy to use
- Make it scalable
- Make it secure




Security

- Customer may not be able to explicitly state what they want in terms of security requirements, but



They know they want their software to be secure.

Cost to fix problem vs. when found



When are these flaws being discovered?
vs.
When are they created?

Cyber-Attacks are a Big Deal

- 94% of malware was delivered through email
- 34% of data breaches that occurred were due to insiders
- 17% of data breaches involved malware
- Over 80% of security breaches were a result of phishing attacks
- 60% of security breaches occurred due to unpatched vulnerabilities
- Attacks on IoT devices grew threefold in early 2019

Frequency and Cost of Cyber-Attacks

- Globally 30,000 a day
- Trillions of dollars



Manifesto for Agile Software Development

We are uncovering better ways of developing software by doing it and helping others do it.
Through this work we have come to value:

Individuals and interactions over processes and tools

Working software over comprehensive documentation

Customer collaboration over contract negotiation

Responding to change over following a plan

That is, while there is value in the items on the right, we value the items on the left more.

Kent Beck
Mike Beedle
Arie van Bennekum
Alistair Cockburn
Ward Cunningham
Martin Fowler

James Grenning
Jim Highsmith
Andrew Hunt
Ron Jeffries
Jon Kern
Brian Marick

Robert C. Martin
Steve Mellor
Ken Schwaber
Jeff Sutherland
Dave Thomas

12 Principles Behind the Agile M. x +

https://www.agilealliance.org/agile101/12-principles-behind-the-agile-manifesto/


Agile Alliance

Agile Essentials Resources Events Community Membership The Alliance

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1	Our highest priority is to satisfy the customer through early and continuous delivery of valuable software.	7	Working software is the primary measure of progress.
2	Welcome changing requirements, even late in development. Agile processes harness change for the customer's competitive advantage.	8	Agile processes promote sustainable development. The sponsors, developers, and users should be able to maintain a constant pace indefinitely.
3	Deliver working software frequently, from a couple of weeks to a couple of months, with a preference to the shorter timescale.	9	Continuous attention to technical excellence and good design enhances agility.
4	Business people and developers must work together daily throughout the project.	10	Simplicity—the art of maximizing the amount of work not done—is essential.
5	Build projects around motivated individuals. Give them the environment and support they need, and trust them to get the job done.	11	The best architectures, requirements, and designs emerge from self-organizing teams.
6	The most efficient and effective method of conveying information to and within a development team is face-to-face	12	At regular intervals, the team reflects on how to become more effective, then tunes and adjusts its behavior accordingly.

Graphical version:



Agile BS Detector




Systemic Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)

- Originally developed for hazard analysis of software-controlled systems
- Nancy Leveson PhD, Professor MIT
- John Thomas PhD MIT
- An alternative to FTA, FMEA, RCA
- Call cyber-attacks hazards and use STPA
- Make implicit security requirements explicit
- Used at the beginning of the software development lifecycle

Identify Hazards and Losses

Hazards


- H1. Malware
- H2. Phishing
- H3. Man-in-the Middle
- H4. Denial of Service
- H5. SQL Injection
- H6. Buffer Overflow
- H7. Zero Day Exploit
- H8. DNS Tunneling



Losses

- L1. Loss of Life or Injury
- L2. Financial Losses
- L3. Loss of Sensitive Information
- L4. Loss of Trade Secrets
- L5. Loss Public Trust
- L6. Loss of Business Operation

Model of Control Structure: Cyber Security as a System



Sub- Hazards: Malware Categories

- H1.1 Adware
- H2.2 Bots
- H1.3 Rootkits
- H1.4 Viruses
- H1.5 Worms
- H1.6 Trojan
- H1.7 Spyware
- H1.8 Keylogger
- H1.9 Ransomware
- H1.10 Scareware

Identify Unsafe Control Actions: 17 Cyber-Attack Types Used

Attack Types

H1. Malware

H1.1 Adware

H1.2 Bots

H1.3 Rootkits

H1.4 Viruses

H1.5 Worms

H1.6 Trojans

H1.7 Spyware

H1.8 Keylogger

H1.9 Ransomware

H1.10 Scareware

H2 Phishing

H3 Man in the Middle

H4 Denial of Service

H5 SQL Injection

H6. Buffer Overflow

H7 Zero Day Exploit

H8 DNS Tunneling

Example Analysis: Adware

M1.1 Run Software to Detect and Remove Known Adware and Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP)

M1.4.1 Assure Virus detection software is running and is up to date


M1.4.2 Detect higher than expected CPU and RAM Memory usage

M1.4.3 Scan active tasks looking for unidentified tasks

M1.4.7 Check for unexpected dialog boxes or windows

M1.8.5 Detect slower activities such as starting programs, browsing, pop ups.

H1.1 Adware



Opportunities for Improvement



- Mitigate Phishing (80%)
- Mitigate Lack of Updating and Patches (60%)
- Address Explicate Security Requirements Early
- Not all mitigations can happen in the application
- Stakeholders must include Network and IT Subject Matter Experts
- Nothing about Agile prohibits these mitigations

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