
Cyber Security Overview

4/13/2022



Cyber Security Overview



Cyber Security Factoids

- Cost of Cyberattacks \$7 Trillion globally in 2021
- US Gross National Product = \$20 Trillion
- Average cost of an attack = \$4.24 Million dollars 3
- A cyberattack occurs every 39 seconds 4
- During this talk 92 cyberattacks will occur (3600/32)

^{4. &}lt;a href="https://spanning.com/blog/cyberattacks-2021-phishing-ransomware-data-breach-statistics/">https://spanning.com/blog/cyberattacks-2021-phishing-ransomware-data-breach-statistics/, How many cyberattacks took place in 2021?





^{1.} https://cybersecurityventures.com/cybercrime-damages-6-trillion-by-2021/

^{2.} https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/gross-domestic-product-4th-guarter-and-year-2020-advance-estimate#:~:text=Current%2Ddollar%20GDP%20decreased%202.3,(tables%201%20and%203)

^{3.} https://www.upguard.com/blog/cost-of-data-breach.

Attack Factoids

- Malware delivered through email 94% 1
- Data breaches that occurred due to insiders 34% 2
- Data breaches that involved malware 19% }
- Security breaches a result of phishing attacks 80% 4
- Security breaches due to unpatched vulnerabilities 60% 5
- Attacks on IoT devices grew threefold in early 2019

^{4,5,6 -} Top cybersecurity facts, figures and statistics, https://www.csoonline.com/article/3153707/top-cybersecurity-facts-figures-and-statistics.html





^{1,2,3 - 2020} data breach Investigation's report, https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/dbir/

Attack Surfaces (Network vs Applications)

- Cause was network vulnerabilities 80%
- Network vulnerabilities considered high or critical risk 2%
- Cause was application vulnerabilities 20%
- Application vulnerabilities considered high or critical risk
 20%

source: 2019 VULNERABILITY STATISTICS REPORT, edgescan™ January 2019



Average total cost and frequency of data breaches by initial attack vector

Measured in US\$ millions



Source: Cost of a data breach report 2021 by Ponemon Institute and IBM

Methods of Cyber Attacks

- Malware
- Phishing
- Man-in-the-Middle
- Denial of Service
- SQL Injection
- Buffer Overflow
- Zero Day Exploit

Source: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/common-cyberattacks.html#~how-cyber-attacks-work

DNS Tunneling

Malware Types

- Adware
- Bots
- Rootkits
- Viruses
- Trojan
- Spyware
- Keylogger
- Ransomware

Source: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/common-cyberattacks.html#~how-cyber-attacks-work

Scareware



Cyber Security and Software Quality Overlap

SAST – Static Analysis Security Testing

Finds:

Null Pointer Dereferences

Buffer Overflows

Uninitialized Variables

Opaque Predicate

Dead Code

Tainted Flow

DAST – Dynamic Analysis Security Testing

Finds:

Test Code Coverage

Addressing errors

Fuzzing

Concolic Testing

 These are both software bugs and potential vulnerabilities that hacker's search for and exploit.

Sources:

IEEE (NCSU) Study ~ 33 million LOC C, C++, since 2001 NORTEL (Network Services Code LLNL Study ~ 6 million LOC C,C++, Scientific Codes since 2006 MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) data base http://cwe.mitre.org/





Cyber Security Standards

ISO/IEC 27001

- Implement an Information security management system
- Set of procedures that states the rules and requirements which has to be satisfied in order to get the organization certified
- Keep all the technology up to date, the servers should exist without vulnerabilities
- Organization has to be audited after the specified interval to remain compiled to this standard

PCIDSS

- Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
- For organizations that accept credit card payments

HIPAA


- Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
- Ensure that their patient's data are fully protected and cannot be leaked anyway

FINRA

- Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
- Financial bodies that handle the funds or aggressively engaged in financial transactions

GDPR

- General Data Protection Regulation
- Make sure that the user's data is secure and cannot be accessed without proper authorization
- Large fines for not complying







Cyber Security Standards

- Cobit 5 Framework https://www.invensislearning.com/blog/what-is-cobit-5/
 - Ideal to start out or for small companies
 - Framework, Maturity Model, Process Descriptions, Control Objectives, Management Guidelines
- ISA 62443-2-1:2009 and 2013 https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/isa-standards-committees/isa99
 - Mostly Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security
 - Hardware and software systems such as DCS, PLC, SCADA
 - Networked electronic sensing, and monitoring and diagnostic systems
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/framework
- NIST Security Framework Ver 1.1 https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/framework
- Crosswalk https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final

Source: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final

MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK™ Framework

	Manalafany		0	D 1			A.H	# dilemaker	
	Wie re in Ferr		Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
_	More information		Forced Authentication	Network Share Discovery	AppleScript		Man in the Browser	Exfiltration Over Physical	Multi-hop Proxy
_	Plist Modification		Hooking	System Time Discovery	Third-party Software		Browser Extensions	Medium	Domain Fronting
	Valid Accounts DLL Search Order Hijacking		Password Filter DLL	Peripheral Device Discovery	Windows Remote Management		Video Capture	Exfiltration Over Command	Data Encoding
			LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning	Account Discovery	SSH Hijacking	LSASS Driver	Audio Capture	and Control Channel	Remote File Copy
_	AppCert DLLs	Process Doppelgänging	Securityd Memory	File and Directory Discovery	Distributed Component	Dynamic Data Exchange	Automated Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Multi-Stage Channels
	Hooking	Mshta	Private Keys	System Information	Object Model	Mshta	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Web Service
	Startup Items	Hidden Files and Directories	Keychain	Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Local Job Scheduling	Email Collection	Automated Exfiltration	Standard Non-Application
	 MITRE Comr 	NO DE LAVINSTICA DE LA	Input Prompt	Security Software	Caplination #hlough	+ a la Trap	Screen Capture	Exfiltration Over Other	Layer Protocol
	- IVINI INC. COLLI	nom vveak	HESSISTEVITUE	meradon	Reviewable Media	ta Dase	Data Staged	Network Medium	Communication Through
	N p p i cu o i s i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	EC_INITITITITION IN	TWO-Factor Authentication	System Network Connections	TTIII GOTTS FLORITING STITUTES	Eddifficit	Input Capture	Exfiltration Over	Removable Media
	Applnit DLLs — Web http://cwe.i	HISTCONTROL	Interception	Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Space after Filename	Data from Network	Alternative Protocol	Multilayer Encryption
	— Web \$FLTD://CWe.l	mitre:@rg:/	Account Manipulation	System Owner/User	Pass the Hash	Execution through Module	Shared Drive	Data Transfer Size Limits	Standard Application
	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	Clear Command History	Replication Through	Discovery	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Load	Data from Local System	Data Compressed	Layer Protocol
	Scheduled Task	Gatekeeper Bypass	Removable Media	System Network Configuration	Shared Webroot	Regsvcs/Regasm	Data from Removable Media		Commonly Used Port
	New Service	Hidden Window	Input Capture	Discovery	Logon Scripts	InstallUtil			Standard Cryptographic
	File System Permissions Weakness	Deobfuscate/Decode Files	Network Sniffing	Application Window	Remote Services	Regsvr32			Protocol
	MITRE ATT&	or Information	Credential Dumping	Discovery	Application Deployment	Execution through API			Custom Cryptographic
	Many Rhs All &	(KisterKerep(e)\Med (engenase	Network Service Scanning	Software	PowerShell			Protocol
	Port Monitors	Regsvcs/Regasm	dentials in Files	Query Registry	Remote File Copy	Rundll32			Data Obfuscation
S	Screensaver	Exploitation of Vulnerability		Remote System Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Scripting			Custom Command and
L	SASS Driver DTTDS: Extra Miles	ekemitre.org/		Permission Groups		Graphical User Interface			Control Protocol
Brow		n Manipulation	•	Discovery		Command-Line Interface			Connection Proxy
Local	Local Job Scheduling Bypass User Account Control			Process Discovery		Scheduled Task			Uncommonly Used Port
Re-ope	Re-opened Applications Process Injection			System Service Discovery		Windows Management			Multiband Communication
F	Rc.common SID-History Injection	Component Object Model				Instrumentation			Fallback Channels
	NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD)								
LC_LOA	DYUB ANTONIO DE LA CONTRA DEL CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DEL CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DEL CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DEL CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DEL CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DE LA CONTRA DE	ai vuinerai	ouity Data	apase uvv	(1))	Service Execution			
La	aunch Agent	Regsvr32	ome, bace		- ,				
Hidden F	iles and Directories	Code Signing							

https://nvd.nist@gov/vuln

J,	.IIIStr gov yvui
	Component Firmware
	Redundant Access
	File Deletion
	Timestomp
	NTFS Extended Attributes
	Process Hollowing
	Disabling Security Tools
	Rundll32
	DLL Side-Loading
	Indicator Removal on Host
	Indicator Removal from
	Tools
	Indicator Blocking
	Software Packing
	Masquerading
	Obfuscated Files or
	Information
	Binary Padding
	Install Root Certificate
	Network Share
	Connection Removal
	Rootkit
	Scripting

Source: attack.mitre.org

.bash_profile and .bashrc
Trap
Launchctl
Office Application Startup
Create Account
External Remote Services
Authentication Package
Netsh Helper DLL
Component Object Model
Hijacking

Redundant Access
Security Support Provider
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Event Subscription
Registry Run Keys /
Start Folder
Change Default
File Association
Component Firmware
Bootkit
Hypervisor
Logon Scripts
Modify Existing Service



Case Study

Overview

Organization

Governance

Causes

Mitigation Measures

Lessons Learned

Timeline Overview

- March 8, 2017 -> NIST issues alert to patch Apache Struts
- March 10, 2017 -> Attack on unpatched Equifax Customer Dispute Web Server begins
- July 30, 2017 -> Equifax discovers unpatched Customer Dispute Web Server
- September 7, 2017 -> Equifax notifies customers of a cyber-attack
- March 10 and July 30, 2017 -> 145.5 Million customer PII records exfiltrated to Chinese IP address
- September 26, 2017 -> Equifax shares down 26%
- Follow on -> \$90 million in attack related costs, \$525 million in class action suits

Sources: https://www.ciodive.com/news/what-caused-the-equifax-breach-failure-to-patch-a-bug/504945/ https://www.secureworld.io/industry-news/day-by-day-timeline-of-equifax-breach

Harvard Business School 9-118-031, Data Breach at Equifax. Suraj Srinivasan, Quinn Pitcher, Jonah S. Goldberg, exhibit 8, Timeline of Equifax Breach Anders Merlin, "Three Equifax Managers Sold Stock Before Cyber Attack Reveled", Bloomberg, Sept. 7,2017.



Organization

- Chief Security Officer (CSO) reports to Chief Legal Officer (CLO) who reports to Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
- CSO is a math major, former software engineer
- CLO is a lawyer, no IT or Security Experience
- CEO, CIO, CSO forced to resign
- Three managers indited for insider trading

Source: https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/equifax-executives-step-down-scrutiny-intensifies-credit-bureaus-n801706

Equifax Organization Chart Richard Smith CEO John Kelley David Webb CSO not part of senior staff Graeme Payne Susan Mauldin CIO Global CSO Patching accountability spread Vulnerability Countermeasures Global Threat and over three organizations Vul. Management Assessment Team Team Team

Governance

Had been given a failing grade for security in prior audits

Was ranked last compared to peers for security

Had been criticized for not maintaining accurate inventories

Was not using a nationally accepted standard for security

Had not acted on recommendations from prior audits

Source: United States Senate: Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, "How Equifax Neglected Cybersecurity and Suffered a Devastating Data Breach", Staff Report March 2019, p36-43.



Causes



- Software with identified vulnerability not patched for 5 months
- Hundreds of SSL certificates not current, the SSL visibility appliance not working
- File integrity monitoring (FIM) was not operative
- Software inventory not up to date
- Application scanner not detecting Apache Struts on customer dispute web Server
- Patching customer dispute web site was involved manual process (took 11 days)

United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, "The Equifax Breach", Majority Staff Report, December 2018, p 71-72

Regular Red Team exercises

Use of white hat hackers or bounty program

Regular pen testing of applications

Would have exposed FIM and visibility appliance inoperative

Red team exercise would have been able to identify vulnerability

Ongoing reconnaissance of industry threats

Mitigation Measures That **Could Have Prevented** the Attack

Sources: Professional Certificate in Cyber Security, MIT https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final https://www.fcc.gov/cyberplanner

Mitigation Measures That Could Have Prevented the Attack

Use of defense in depth and Segmentation

Use of least privilege

Use of zero trust

Isolate PII data bases from other systems

Encryption of PII at rest

Retain Logs longer than 30 days

Accurate Inventory of Resources

Security Culture from the top down

Single Point of Accountability, Reports to CEO

Automated Patching

SIEM/SOAR

Act on prior audit findings

Adoption of Security Standard

Sources: Professional Certificate in Cyber Security, MIT https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final https://www.fcc.gov/cyberplanner



Lessons Learned

- This attack was preventable
- The importance of valuing cyber security
- Value of comprehensive risk assessment and mitigations
- Value of mitigation measures
- Value of having a Response Plan
- Value of acting on Audit and Assessment findings
- High cost of cyber attacks

Source: The Equifax Breach of 2017, MIT Cybersecurity Capstone, Gregory Pope, March 2022 https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-stop-breaches-equifax/



Why? Speculation on my Part

- The 145.5 million records of stolen PII has never been seen since. It has not been offered for sale on the dark web.
- The list of names of consumers, where they work, and that they have credit problems could be of great use to espionage agents.
- The Equifax data combined with the 2015 OPM attack data of 24 million records of security clearance holders allows espionage services to recruit from cleared staff with credit problems.

What Can I Do:

- Recognize phishing emails, just say no to clicking the link
- Use strong passwords, change frequently
- Do not leave default passwords
- Do not use the same passwords for personal and business
- Don't open Word or Excel attachments with Macros

- Update and patch systems ASAP
- Limit your job description on social media accounts (sound unimportant)
- Limit mentioning security tools names used on job postings
- Know who you are talking too on the phone, especially help desk
- Report stolen or lost credentials

Source: Professional Certificate in Cyber Security, MIT, Modules 4,11,13,14

